

ANALYSIS OF NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN THE PROGRAM FOR THE PREVENTION AND ERADICATION OF DRUG ABUSE AND ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFICKING (P4GN) IN TANGERANG CITY

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Abstract

The handling of narcotics as a wicked problem requires network-based governance involving the government, the private sector, and civil society. However, P4GN studies generally continue to focus on program effectiveness, implementation barriers, and law enforcement achievements. In contrast, the dynamics of network governance in high-risk areas (red zones) have received little attention. This study aims to analyze P4GN network governance in Tangerang City. It uses a descriptive qualitative approach with purposive sampling of key P4GN actors. Data collection was conducted through observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis. The data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña with the four-dimensional framework of network governance by Klijn & Koppenjan: contact, trust, information exchange, and resource exchange. The findings indicate the need to strengthen the design of the P4GN network through the preparation of SOPs and MoUs across actors, the integration of a documented data sharing system, the improvement of human resource capacity and rehabilitation services, and the expansion of private sector and community involvement, accompanied by efforts to reduce stigma, to support the sustainability of collaboration.

Keywords: Network Governance, P4GN Program, Multi-Actor Collaboration, Narcotics, Tangerang City.

1. Introduction

Network governance is a public governance approach that emphasizes coordination and collaboration among interdependent actors (government, the private sector, and civil society) within relatively horizontal arrangements (Sundram, 2025). In this perspective, the state is not the sole dominant actor; instead, it becomes one node that interacts, negotiates, and exchanges resources with other actors to address complex public problems. The narcotics issue is a classic example of a wicked problem because it involves multiple, interlinked dimensions (law enforcement, public health, social vulnerability, and economic incentives). At the same time, illicit networks constantly adapt to regulatory pressure. Therefore, narcotics governance requires network-based problem-solving, where inter-organizational collaboration, such as data sharing, formal agreements, and organizational adjustments, can strengthen policy outcomes. As shown in the Jakarta ERP study, the relationship between government actors, the private sector, and the community is interdependent, a condition that is also a key feature of the governance network in the implementation of the narcotics issue (Annisa & Sampurna, 2024).

Drug abuse and trafficking have become serious threats to national security and the quality



of public services, reflected in the increasing sophistication of illicit networks and persistent limitations in enforcement capacity (Mbolela et al., 2025). In Indonesia, the P4GN policy framework has been strengthened through Law No. 35 of 2009 and Presidential Instruction No. 2 of 2020, both of which emphasize cross-sector synergy in prevention and eradication. However, implementation at the local level often faces institutional fragmentation, uneven capacity across agencies, and coordination problems that weaken collective performance. This makes narcotics governance a relevant empirical arena for testing whether network governance works not only at the level of formal design but also at the level of operational dynamics. Apart from narcotics, the study by Itu et al. (2025) found that suboptimal coordination among actors, inadequate communication, ineffective feedback, and a lack of trust stemming from limited information disclosure also posed challenges to the program and hindered its success.

Banten Province is strategically and geographically vulnerable to drug trafficking. The province has one international airport, a 509 km coastline, and borders two straits, creating multiple potential smuggling routes. Mapping conducted by the Banten Provincial Narcotics Agency indicates that at least four cities (Tangerang City, South Tangerang City, Serang City, and Cilegon City) consistently contain areas categorized as high risk. Tangerang City is repeatedly classified as a “red zone” due to its strategic position as an economic buffer and gateway for the movement of people and goods to and from Jakarta and other regions. This vulnerability is reinforced by a significant increase in general crime rates in recent years (2021–2024), as shown below.

Table 1. Crime Rates in Tangerang City

Years	Crime Rates
2021	906
2022	1.006
2023	2.812
2024	3.706

Source: Tangerang City Police Headquarters, 2025

Table 1 indicates a sharp increase in recorded crimes over four years. The number rose from 906 cases (2021) to 1,006 (2022), then surged to 2,812 (2023) and reached 3,706 (2024). In contrast, drug case disclosures show a declining trend, as presented below:

Table 2. Data Reveals Drug Cases in Tangerang City

Years	Data Reveals Drug Cases
2020	270
2021	264
2022	240
2023	211
2024	194

Source: Tangerang City Police Headquarters, 2025

The decline in disclosed drug cases cannot be automatically interpreted as a decline in



narcotics circulation. When a city remains categorized as a red zone while overall crime rises sharply, declining disclosure numbers may instead reflect a gap between threat intensity and operational capacity. This mismatch is analytically important because it signals that policy “outputs” (reported cases) may not reflect the “outcome” (actual circulation), especially when coordination and detection depend on multi-actor systems with unequal resources and fragmented information. Because reporting still relies on reports from the public, and Winanda (2023) research also mentions that many people still do not trust law enforcement officials in reporting, research Umpain & Herachwati (2024) explains that to increase public trust, it is necessary to coordinate IT and marketing strategies in the public sector to improve service quality, build public trust, and increase flexibility.

In terms of policy design, the Tangerang City Government and the Tangerang City National Narcotics Agency (BNN) have formalized P4GN implementation through regional and mayoral regulations and operationalized it through communication forums and regional action plans that involve local government elements, law enforcement, the private sector, and community groups. Actors engaged include BNN Tangerang City, Tangerang City Metro Police, the National Unity and Politics Agency, the District Attorney's Office, correctional institutions, the Immigration Office, the Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO), rehabilitation foundations, Community-Based Intervention, and non-governmental community organizations such as the National Anti-Drug Movement. This constellation reflects a policy network that is expected to support both horizontal and vertical collaboration across prevention, enforcement, and recovery.

Research on network governance has consistently emphasized that complex public problems are more effectively addressed through inter-organizational collaboration rather than hierarchical control. Studies highlight that governance networks rely on interaction routines, trust formation, information sharing, and resource exchange among interdependent actors operating across sectoral boundaries. However, the literature also identifies recurring vulnerabilities, including fragmented coordination, dependence on dominant lead agencies, weak institutionalization of informal cooperation, and unequal resource capacities that undermine network stability and performance. These dynamics suggest that the effectiveness of governance networks depends not only on formal design but also on the quality of the network's relational and operational mechanisms.

Within the context of narcotics control and drug eradication policies, previous studies in Indonesia have largely focused on implementation effectiveness and participation levels. Winanda (2023) identifies weak inter-agency commitment and limited community involvement as major constraints in P4GN implementation. Similarly, Junian (2020) highlights persistent integration problems, particularly the marginal involvement of non-governmental actors such as businesses and local communities in prevention efforts. In contrast, Aziz (2023) demonstrates that stakeholder cooperation can significantly accelerate P4GN implementation and strengthen community-level outcomes. Even research that does not focus on narcotics, such as that by Rani et al. (2025), shows that collaboration between governments is necessary for the integrated functioning of markets and terminals. While these studies confirm the importance of collaboration, they conceptualize coordination as an implementation variable rather than as a governance mechanism with its own internal dynamics.



More broadly, criminological and correctional studies provide complementary insights by linking rising general crime rates with increased narcotics risks and warning that correctional institutions are rarely insulated from drug circulation. Despite these contributions, existing research remains limited in explaining how governance networks function in practice under high-risk conditions. In particular, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of network governance mechanisms in high-risk localities, or “red zones,” where policy performance depends on synchronized action across enforcement, prevention, assessment, and rehabilitation domains. This gap underscores the need for a network governance perspective that moves beyond evaluating outcomes and barriers to examine how interaction patterns, trust, information flows, and resource distribution shape P4GN implementation on the ground.

This gap becomes evident in Tangerang City. Beyond law enforcement dynamics, narcotics vulnerability can also be observed in suspect profiles, which indicate which social groups are most exposed and, therefore, which actors should serve as strategic nodes in prevention. The occupational distribution of suspects is shown below:

Table 3. The Suspect's Job in the Drug Case in Tangerang City

Type of Job	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	TOTAL
Police	6	0	1	0	1	8
Military	0	0	0	0	0	0
Government Employees	0	1	0	0	0	1
Business/Entrepreneurship	87	54	43	46	56	286
Private Employee	166	159	184	130	89	728
College Student	16	11	2	0	1	30
Student	8	5	2	0	0	15
Others	56	56	91	112	82	397

Source: Tangerang City Police Headquarters, 2025

Table 3 shows that private employees and entrepreneurs account for the majority of suspects in narcotics cases (2020–2024). Analytically, this pattern should make the private sector a strategic partner for workplace-based prevention. However, active cooperation between BNN Tangerang City and private entities remains minimal, indicating that a key node in the prevention network is not systematically integrated. This is not merely an implementation “obstacle,” but a governance-network problem: the prevention cluster is missing strong participation from the actor that directly governs the most vulnerable occupational groups.

Recent network governance scholarship has moved beyond claiming that collaboration matters toward examining mechanisms that make networks effective: micro-dynamics of interaction, trust under uncertainty, governance of information flows across formal–informal channels, and structural vulnerability created by unequal resources. These debates also highlight network fragility, dependence on a dominant lead actor, fragmented information due to weak data governance, and uneven capacity, making collaboration complementary but unstable. For P4GN, this matters because performance depends on synchronized work across the enforcement, prevention, assessment, correctional management, and rehabilitation domains, each with distinct



mandates and constraints.

State of the art in network governance research shows a shift from proving that collaboration matters toward explaining how networks work in practice, emphasizing interaction routines, trust production, information-flow governance, and the effects of unequal resources. However, the P4GN literature gap remains: most studies still prioritize effectiveness and implementation barriers, while in-depth evidence on network governance mechanisms in high-risk “red zone” localities is limited. This study’s contribution is to fill that gap by diagnosing P4GN network governance dynamics in Tangerang City, thereby reading weaknesses as governance-design problems rather than isolated obstacles. By doing so, the study offers operational implications for strengthening SOPs/MoUs, documented data systems, and capacity equalization in prevention and rehabilitation.

Based on this conceptual and empirical context, this study addresses a research gap in P4GN literature by examining the network governance dynamics of P4GN implementation in a high-risk locality. Specifically, in-depth studies analyzing relational patterns, coordination mechanisms, trust formation, information-sharing practices, and the distribution of resources and roles among stakeholders in red-zone areas, such as Tangerang City, remain limited. This limitation is especially salient given two concrete governance signals in Tangerang: (1) suspect occupational profiles dominated by private employees and entrepreneurs, indicating that private-sector involvement should be central yet remains weak; and (2) the Integrated Assessment Team mechanism which should integrate legal and rehabilitation pathways is reportedly not functioning optimally, contributing to punitive bias and accumulation of drug offenders in correctional institutions while rehabilitation uptake remains limited. These issues signal a discrepancy between multisector collaboration emphasized in P4GN policy design and fragmented network practice on the ground.

Therefore, analyzing P4GN implementation through a network governance lens is crucial to identify where the network functions effectively, where it fails, and what operational strengthening is required. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine interaction patterns, trust formation, information sharing, and resource exchange structured within the P4GN governance network in Tangerang City.

2. Methods

This descriptive study uses qualitative methodology. The purpose of this study is to analyze how network governance plays an key role in implementing the Prevention, Eradication, Abuse, and Illegal Distribution of Drugs program in Tangerang City. The concept of “Network Governance” is the basis of this research. Tangerang City is the object of this research. Tangerang City was chosen at random because it has the highest vulnerability level among all districts and cities in Banten Province. The researchers used the proposed network management model by Klijn & Koppenjan (2016), which consists of four elements: 1) Contact, 2) Trust, 3) Sharing Information, and 4) Resources Exchange.

Sampling was conducted using a non-probability, purposive sampling technique, which allows researchers to deliberately select informants with relevant knowledge, institutional authority, and practical experience related to the P4GN governance network. Informant selection



was based on the following criteria: (1) formal involvement in P4GN implementation at the local level; (2) institutional responsibility in prevention, law enforcement, rehabilitation, correctional management, or inter-agency coordination; and (3) direct experience in cross-sector collaboration related to narcotics governance. Based on these criteria, informants were categorized into key informants and secondary informants. Key informants consisted of actors with central coordinating and decision-making roles, while secondary informants provided complementary insights from supporting institutions and community-based organizations.

The informants in this study consisted of 13 individuals representing government agencies, private-sector organizations, and community-based institutions involved in the P4GN network in Tangerang City, including:

- a) Officials from the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) of Tangerang City (Prevention and Community Empowerment Division and Eradication Division);
- b) Officers from the Tangerang City Metro Police Narcotics Investigation Unit;
- c) Officials from the National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol) of Tangerang City;
- d) Representatives of correctional institutions (Class I and Class IIA Tangerang Prisons);
- e) Officials from the Class I Non-TPI Tangerang Immigration Office;
- f) Representatives from the Tangerang City District Attorney's Office;
- g) Officials from the Tangerang City Health Office;
- h) Representatives of the Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO);
- i) Representatives of community-based and non-governmental organizations, including the Nusantara Drug Rehabilitation Foundation (YASIBARA), Community-Based Intervention (IBM), and the National Anti-Drug Movement (GANNAS).

Data were collected through three main techniques: (1) in-depth interviews with key and secondary informants to capture perspectives on interaction patterns, trust, information sharing, and resource exchange within the P4GN network; (2) field observations to examine coordination practices, institutional interactions, and implementation dynamics; and (3) documentation studies of laws, regulations, policy reports, cooperation agreements, and official records related to P4GN implementation in Tangerang City. The research instruments, particularly semi-structured interview guidelines, were developed based on the network governance framework proposed by Klijn and Koppenjan, which emphasizes contact, trust, information sharing, and resource exchange.

Qualitative data analysis was conducted concurrently with data collection using the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, which involves data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Miles et al., 2014). To ensure data validity and reliability, this study employed source triangulation by comparing information from different institutional actors and method triangulation by cross-checking interview findings with observations and documentary evidence.

3. Results and Discussion


This research not only presents field findings but also analytically links them to the network governance framework to assess how patterns of coordination and collaboration between actors are formed in the implementation of P4GN. Based on this, the following section



presents the P4GN Network Governance Model in Tangerang City as an illustration of the program's relationship structure, the roles of actors, and the dynamics of interactions that determine the program's success, as explained below.

Network Governance Model of the P4GN Program in Tangerang City

MACTOR (Matrix of Alliances, Conflicts, Tactics, Objectives, and Recommendations) analysis is a strategic forecasting method used to map stakeholder relationships, power dynamics, and potential alliances or conflicts in policy and governance contexts. In this study, MACTOR is applied to the P4GN program in Tangerang City to identify actor positions, convergence and divergence of interests, and their implications for network governance performance.



Picture 1. Grafik Order 1 Divergences Between Actors
 Source: Processed Research Results, 2025


Picture 1. Order-1 Divergence between Actors illustrates the level of direct divergence in actors' positions toward the analyzed objectives. Order-1 divergence refers to immediate differences in viewpoints among actors, without accounting for indirect influences mediated by other actors in the network.

The figure shows that all identified divergences fall within the weakest divergence level, indicated by grey dashed lines and a value of "1" for each relationship. No visual indicators of low, moderate, strong, or very strong divergence are present. Several actors, such as BNN Pemberdayaan, correctional institutions, GANNAS, the metropolitan police, the district



attorney's office, the immigration office, and BNN P2M, are connected only by these minimal divergence links. This pattern suggests that differences among actors are limited and mainly reflect variations in institutional roles, mandates, or operational approaches rather than fundamental disagreements over policy objectives.

The absence of stronger divergence signals indicates that the governance network is relatively non-conflictual and conducive to collaboration. Low divergence implies that actors broadly share similar strategic directions, even though they may differ in implementation methods. Nevertheless, minor divergences, if left unmanaged, may still lead to miscommunication or role overlap over time. Therefore, this condition highlights the importance of reinforcing convergence, particularly among key actors, through regular coordination forums, cross-institutional communication, and clearer role delineation. Strategic actors such as BNN, the metropolitan police, and correctional institutions can play a bridging role in maintaining low divergence while strengthening overall alignment within the P4GN governance network. Next is the degree of convergence (agreement and consent) between actors, as illustrated below:



Picture 2. Grafik order 1 convergences between actors
 Source: Processed Research Results, 2025

Picture 2 Actor Convergence Analysis illustrates the degree of similarity in interests, objectives, and positions among actors within the governance system. Convergence reflects the extent to which actors share aligned perspectives on the analyzed issues, with line color and thickness indicating the strength of that alignment, ranging from very weak to very strong.



The figure shows that several actors, including correctional institutions, the National Unity and Politics Agency (Kesbangpol), and Community-Based Intervention (IBM), exhibit multiple moderate-to-strong convergence ties, suggesting relatively broad alignment with other actors and potential bridging roles within the network. The strongest convergence is observed between BNN P2M and the metropolitan police, indicating a high level of shared interests and well-aligned collaboration, particularly in prevention and law enforcement activities. In contrast, actors such as the district attorney's office and the Indonesian Employers Association (APINDO) are mainly connected through weak convergence ties, indicating limited alignment and partial integration within the network. This uneven pattern of convergence suggests that collaboration remains concentrated among a subset of actors. Strengthening coordination and communication, especially for actors with weak convergence, is therefore necessary to achieve a more balanced and effective P4GN governance network. The Network Governance theory proposed by Klijn & Koppenjan (2016), namely Contact, Trust, Sharing Information, and Resources Exchange, will be explained as follows:

a) Contact

Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) conceptualize contact as the core mechanism through which interdependent actors coordinate, negotiate, and combine contributions; hence, network quality is judged less by the quantity of meetings than by the pattern of contributions, the continuity of interaction, and mutual benefits that sustain collaboration incentives. In Tangerang City, the P4GN network is substantively multi-actor, involving state agencies (BNN, police, National Unity and Political Agency, the prosecutor's), custodial and supervisory services (prisons/detention centers, Immigration), the private sector (APINDO), and civil society/community organizations (e.g., GANNAS, YASIBARA). This composition confirms capacity interdependence: no single organization can address narcotics governance alone, and contact becomes the operational channel through which authority, field access, legitimacy, detection facilities, community outreach, and rehabilitation capacity are assembled into joint action supporting Gedeona (2013) argument about the limits of single-institution implementation and contradicting Ma'arif (2013) depiction of systematic marginalization of non-governmental actors.

The governance problem is not the absence of actors but the instability of interactions. Although contact is partially institutionalized through forums, coordination meetings, periodic outreach, BNN-APINDO cooperation, and IBM assistance, coordination still peaks in response to incidents (e.g., prison raids, Integrated Assessment Team activation, foreign national cases, ad hoc socialization requests). This event-driven rhythm indicates weak institutionalization: coordination is activated by case pressure rather than secured by cross-actor procedures that stabilize expectations and reduce transaction costs. In Provan & Kenis (2008) terms, the observed surge of contact under collective-response needs is predictable. Still, in network-governance terms, it signals that contact is functioning as crisis management rather than a routinized coordination asset.

The consequence is a network whose benefits are visible yet not "locked in". Actors do report mutual gains. BNN expands program reach, police gain legitimacy and operational support, prisons access rehabilitation-related capacity, Immigration benefits



from testing access and inter-agency coordination, while APINDO and NGOs gain reputational and institutional legitimacy. However, fluctuations in community participation, reduced monitoring of IBM cadres, the absence of inter-agency SOPs, and reliance on BNN as the leading sector show that reciprocity has not been translated into durable coordination rules. As a result, collaboration remains vulnerable to shifts in leadership commitment and organizational capacity, limiting the network’s ability to accumulate learning and sustain coordination for prevention and rehabilitation over time. This extends Hidayat & Susanti (2015) and Nasrulhaq (2020): mutual benefit may attract participation, but without institutionalized continuity (via shared procedures), contact frequency becomes a weak indicator of governance strength, precisely the point emphasized by Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) that contact is the network “engine” enabling effective resource exchange, not a ceremonial add-on.

The Table below presents a comparison between Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) theory and research findings to identify the strengths of the network and the institutional gaps in coordination that still make contact events dependent on key actors.

Table 4. Theory Vs. Findings From The Contact Aspect

Sub-Aspect Contact	Theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)	The Field Findings of P4GN in Tangerang City
Contribution Of Actors	Contact facilitates the integration of contributions from various actors through coordination, negotiation, and exchange of resources within the network	Cross-actor contributions: Human resources & field access (apparatus), policy legitimacy & coordination (government), facility/service support (prisons/immigration), education-rehabilitation (NGOs/institutions), community mobilization, reputation & information support (private)
Duration Of Interaction	The contact should ideally be sustainable, creating a stable coordination routine to maintain the adaptability of the network.	There is a routine pattern (forums, meetings, periodic socialization, cooperation), but coordination often intensifies during cases/incidents (raids, integrated assessments, coordination of foreign nationals, sudden requests).
Mutual Benefits	Mutual benefits serve as an important incentive for actors to remain involved and to share resources.	The benefits are clear for each actor (program reach, legitimacy, rehabilitation capacity, monitoring of foreign nationals, private reputation, NGO legitimacy, community capacity building).

Source: Results Processed By Researchers, 2025

b) Trust

Trust in Tangerang's P4GN network functions primarily as a compliance-based



arrangement rather than an adaptive coordination asset. Viewed through Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) trust dimensions, legitimacy and participation are largely secured by macro-level regulations rather than shared operational routines embedded in cross-agency SOPs/MoUs. This reliance enables rapid mobilization, but it also leaves everyday coordination vulnerable to discretion, key-person dependence, and informal ties, as Jumhur & Doly (2024), note, where weak internal guidelines push networks to fall back on higher-level legal authority at the expense of technical adaptability.

Evaluation forums do provide a venue to surface recurrent governance frictions (e.g., participation gaps, weak horizontal coordination, budget constraints, and stigma), aligning with Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) and the argument of Andini et al. (2025) that periodic reviews can sustain commitment. However, in Tangerang, their trust-building effect is conditional: when forums do not produce binding follow-up outputs such as cross-actor SOPs, clear role allocation, shared indicators, and monitoring mechanisms, they risk becoming a discursive substitute for learning. Under these conditions, "trust" is negotiated in meetings but not institutionalized in routines, so coordination performance remains difficult to reproduce across units and over time.

Empirically, reliability is uneven: it is stronger in program domains that are easily standardized (notably prevention and resilience outputs) and weaker in nodes that require tight interdependence, particularly rehabilitation and the Integrated Assessment Team. This imbalance has a clear governance consequence: organizational performance may appear strong. At the same time, network integration remains fragile, sustaining punitive drift and limiting access to rehabilitation, echoing Wibowo (2013) on the stabilizing value of routine relations and reinforcing Nata et al. (2025) and Yanti (2025) on structural constraints in recovery services that pull practice back toward enforcement. Trust, in short, keeps the network operating. Still, it is not yet robust enough to rebalance incentives and behavior across the enforcement–rehabilitation continuum, which is the critical test of sustainability. The following are the performance achievements that reflect the level of institutional reliability of the Tangerang City BNN during 2022–2024:

Table 5. Institutional Reliability of the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) of Tangerang City Based on Performance Achievements in 2022–2024

Performance	Years					
	2022		2023		2024	
	Target	Realization	Target	Realization	Target	Realization
Teenagers' Resilience to Drug Abuse	52	51,37	51,37	55,37	55,37	55,8
Percentage	99%		108%		101%	
Family resilience to drug abuse	78,67	84,196	79	87,232	87,232	85,179
Percentage	107,02%		110,42%		97,65%	
Independence Participation	3,2	3,22	3,25	3,25	3,3	3,36



Performance	Years					
	2022		2023		2024	
	Target	Realization	Target	Realization	Target	Realization
Presentase	101%		100%		102%	
Number of trained IBM service providers in 2024	0	0	10	15	10	10
Percentage			150%		100%	
Satisfaction with drug rehabilitation services	0	0	3,2	3,575	3,42	3,59
Percentage			112%		105%	
Drug abusers and/or addicts who have experienced an improvement in their quality of life	0	0	60	78,41	68	88,69
Percentage			131%		130%	

Source: National Narcotics Agency Tangerang City, 2025

Table 5 indicates that BNN meets or exceeds most targets, yet these achievements cannot be treated as a direct proxy for network reliability. Where Integrated Assessment and rehabilitation coordination remain weak, output indicators risk overstating governance maturity by masking coordination bottlenecks and downstream capacity deficits. Consequently, performance claims require triangulation with field evidence on cross-agency routines and integrative functions, rather than solely on programmatic attainment.

Finally, trust is also sustained by durable inter-actor relations and repeated commitments, aligning with Mediansyah (2022) and Dewi (2019) on goodwill-based collaboration. Yet reported misuse of institutional names for socialization costs or sponsorship-seeking shifts trust from an internal coordination issue to a public legitimacy risk, supporting Wibowo (2013) warning that threats can originate from peripheral actors who appropriate network authority. In this context, Handesta (2025) is not merely a coordination prescription: strengthening SOPs/MoUs serves as reputational risk control by providing verification, accountability, and decision documentation capabilities that become more critical under digitally mediated narcotics dynamics.

Based on the above findings, the following analysis summarizes the relationship between the conceptual framework of trust in network governance and the reality of implementing the P4GN network in Tangerang City. Using the aspects of trust according to Klijn & Koppenjan (2016) as an analytical lens, the following table compares theoretical expectations with the empirical evidence found.



Table 6. Theory Vs. Findings From The Trust Aspect

Sub-Aspect Trust	Theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)	The Field Findings of P4GN in Tangerang City
Trust In Agreements	Formal agreements (MoU, Standard Operating Procedures, cooperation contracts) build certainty of roles, clarify expectations, and form the basis for stable coordination	Trust mostly relies on macro regulations (Law 35/2009, Local Regulation 1/2023, Local Regulation 115/2023) and formal agreements such as NPHD; however, not all units/divisions have detailed MoUs/SOPs (e.g., eradication is more situational).
Benefits Of Concern	Concerns/conflicts are seen as sources of information for improvement; evaluation forums strengthen mutual understanding and improve the quality of joint decisions.	Evaluation forums provide a space to raise real issues: low participation, weak horizontal coordination, budget constraints, stigma against former users, differences in role perceptions, and the threat of online narcotics
Reliability	Trust grows from consistent behavior: regular attendance, predictable responses, repeated commitment, and stable achievements.	The benefits are clear for each actor (program reach, legitimacy, rehabilitation capacity, monitoring The leading sector attends meetings/activities regularly; cross-agency involvement (even those not directly related) appears in joint activities. Performance data for 2022–2024 mostly exceed targets for certain prevention/resilience and rehabilitation service indicators.
Absence Of Opportunistic Behavior	Less opportunism reduces the risk of collaboration; transparency, accountability, and social control prevent misconduct that damages trust.	The majority of actors did not encounter opportunism between agencies; there are practices of transparency (anti-gratification, complaint channels). But indications have emerged of misuse of the institution's name for socialization costs/seeking sponsors.
Trust In Good Intentions	Goodwill enables actors to share resources, bear risks, and maintain long-term collaboration despite uncertainty.	The long-term collaboration between the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), the Police, the National Unity and Politics Agency, the Indonesian Employers Association, and mass organizations builds confidence that actors are working to their full capacity; non-governmental actors feel supported (facilities, training, network access), but hope for a stronger



Sub-Aspect Trust	Theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)	The Field Findings of P4GN in Tangerang City
		response to the issue of online narcotics..

Source: Results processed by researchers, 2025

c) Sharing Information

Information sharing in Tangerang’s P4GN network functions as a core governance mechanism rather than a routine administrative activity. It enables actors to align problem definitions and reduce operational uncertainty, consistent with Idris (2018), who positions information as a key lever of cooperation in policy networks. However, the main weakness is not a lack of information but weak information governance. When the network circulates broad data without shared filtering rules and common standards, coordination becomes vulnerable to overload and competing interpretations. This supports Klijn and Koppenjan (2016), who argue that complex problems require sense-making and process management; without these, the volume of information reduces clarity rather than strengthening collective capacity.

In terms of quality, multi-layer verification enhances accuracy, supporting Lehtonen & Uusikylä (2021) in arguing that reliability in collaboration is often achieved through repeated checks. The critical deficits are timeliness and traceability, which determine whether accurate information can be used to support decision-making. This aligns Badan Narkotika Nasional (BNN) (2024) which states that coordination and cross-agency data sharing remain major obstacles for P4GN. In Tangerang, accurate but delayed or poorly documented information raises transaction costs through meeting cycles, procedural bottlenecks, and service-hour constraints, slowing response capacity. This study, therefore, shifts attention from accuracy alone to policy utility, where the real test is whether information supports timely action and institutional learning.

At the integrated assessment stage, miscommunication and technical obstacles corroborate Nata et al. (2025) that barriers in assessment reduce rehabilitation effectiveness. This study adds a network mechanism explanation: failures occur when procedural information is not internalized by service users, generating anxiety, resistance, and noncompliance. The problem is not only literacy or technology, but a communication design that treats recipients as passive targets rather than active links in the information chain.

Finally, the reliance on WhatsApp accelerates coordination but weakens accountability and organizational memory, a common trade-off in network settings. Extending Badan Narkotika Nasional (BNN) (2024), in comparison with the research conducted by Mindarti et al. (2024), explains the need for the smooth dissemination of information through websites, social media, or WhatsApp groups. The issue in Tangerang is not merely the absence of formal mechanisms but also the reliance on informal channels that are fragile under staff turnover and leave weak decision trails. Overall, prior studies correctly identify information as central to collaboration. Still, the Tangerang findings emphasize three conditions for sustainable performance: standardized data and shared



meanings to prevent fragmentation; integration of fast, informal channels with formal documentation; and systematic translation strategies that build shared understanding across both institutions and service recipients.

To highlight the position of the findings within the framework of network governance and to show the points of agreement and gaps in implementation, the following description is summarized in a table comparing theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) and empirical findings on two main sub-aspects, namely the breadth of information coverage and the quality of information, as shown in the following table:

Table 7. Theory Vs. Findings From The Sharing Information Aspect

Sub-Aspect	Theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)	The Field Findings of P4GN in Tangerang City
The breadth of information	Information exchange should reflect the interdependence of actors and the need for sense-making on complex issues. The more complex the issue, the more necessary it is to have multi-dimensional information (strategic–operational–cross-sector) to unify perceptions and align actions.	The information exchanged covers a broad spectrum: strategic (vulnerability mapping, circulation trends, identification of partners) and operational (integrated assessment results, foreign national data, operation reports), including cross-sector information from the business world/community.
Quality of information	The quality of information in network governance is determined by its ability to reduce uncertainty through reliability (accuracy/validity), relevance, and timeliness.	Actors assess accuracy and relevance as relatively good because the data is verified (field checks, inter-agency confirmation, administrative validation). Timeliness is sometimes disrupted by procedures/service hours/coordination meetings. Obstacles also arise in integrated assessments (miscommunication, connection disruptions), community reports are not always accurate, and WhatsApp is fast but lacks documentation.

Source: Results processed by researchers, 2025

d) Resource Exchange

Resource exchange in Tangerang’s P4GN network reflects the interdependence among actors, as no single institution possesses all the resources required to address the narcotics problem (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Accordingly, effective implementation depends on the complementary mobilization of human resources and expertise, strategic and technical information, legal authority, infrastructure and facilities, and financial and administrative support, assessed through resource availability and resource adequacy.

In prevention and community empowerment, BNN’s Prevention and Community



Empowerment Unit (P2M) provides funding, trained personnel, and adaptive program designs, complemented by facilitation from Kesbangpol and social resources from community actors (IBM, neighborhood groups). However, community-level activities remain resource-constrained and highly dependent on external support, consistent with findings by Muhajannah (2025). In rehabilitation, BNN provides technical assistance, standardization, and training, supported by health facilities under the City Health Office, yet limited facilities, counselor shortages, and non-earmarked funding constrain effectiveness, as noted by Herindrasti (2018).

Resource availability is relatively stronger in law enforcement, where BNN’s eradication unit supplies intelligence and investigative capacity, reinforced by police and prosecutorial authority, with immigration contributing early-warning data. Conversely, correctional institutions face severe staffing and infrastructure deficits that weaken control efforts, consistent with Doly (2025). Overall, resource adequacy remains uneven: while core enforcement institutions perceive sufficiency based on formal mandates Rifai et al. (2025), prevention units, rehabilitation providers, community organizations, and prisons report significant gaps, creating bottlenecks and reliance on NGOs. This substitution improves short-term adaptability but poses governance risks when coordination and standardization are weak Saputri et al. (2023),

Following the network governance framework of Klijn & Koppenjan (2016), the assessment was conducted by comparing theoretical expectations regarding resource availability and adequacy with empirical realities in the field. The following comparison summarizes the points of convergence and divergence between theory and findings, as described in the table below:

Table 8. Theory Vs. Findings From The Resource Exchange Aspect

Sub-Aspect	Theory (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016)	The Field Findings of P4GN in Tangerang City
Availability of Resources	Information exchange should reflect the interdependence of actors and the need for sense-making on complex issues. The more complex the issue, the more necessary it is to have multi-dimensional information (strategic–operational–cross-sector) to unify perceptions and align actions.	The information exchanged covers a broad spectrum: strategic (vulnerability mapping, circulation trends, identification of partners) and operational (integrated assessment results, foreign national data, operation reports), including cross-sector information from the business world/community.
Sufficiency of Resources	Networks are effective when actors have a mobilizable resource (authority, information, human resources, budget, facilities, social access) to manage interdependence and uncertainty.	A cross-actor resource portfolio is available and complementary: authority & enforcement capacity, strategic data/information, administrative-fiscal support from local government, social networks of forums/communities, and the private sector

Source: Results processed by researchers, 2025



4. Conclusion

The P4GN network in Tangerang City is relatively effective and cross-sectoral. However, it is not yet consolidated because integration between clusters is still fragile, and coordination tends to strengthen when cases/incidents arise. Theoretically, these findings confirm that network governance can appear to “function” through regulatory legitimacy and the achievement of indicators, but remains vulnerable if cross-actor SOPs, shared data standards, and decision documentation are not institutionalized. The role of non-state actors is not yet equal. In practical terms, strengthening efforts need to be directed at developing joint SOPs and indicators to lock in routine integration, improving data management/documentation, involving NGOs, the private sector, and communities at the planning and evaluation levels, and closing gaps in human resources/counselors and sustainable funding for prevention and rehabilitation, including the optimization of the Integrated Assessment Team. The limitations of this study include its qualitative nature and focus on a single region, which limit its generalizability; further research could compare several “red zones” and test the impact of SOP/data standard implementation on TAT performance and rehabilitation outcomes.

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