Presidential Term Limits, Constitutional Justice, and Eternity Clauses: Preventing Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in Indonesia

Authors

  • Haikal Arsalan Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Surabaya, Indonesia
  • Rofi Aulia Rahman University of Szeged, Hungary
  • Dinda Silviana Putri Universitas Surabaya, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30996/mk.v19i1.133063

Keywords:

presidential term limits, eternity clauses, unconstitutional constitutional amendment, Indonesia

Abstract

Constitutional justice functions as a substantive mechanism to uphold constitutional supremacy, limit state power, and protect fundamental democratic values. In presidential systems, one of its most critical institutional expressions is the regulation of presidential term limits, which aims to prevent the concentration of executive authority and to ensure democratic leadership rotation. This article examines the relationship between presidential term limits, constitutional justice, and the doctrine of eternity clauses as a means of preventing unconstitutional constitutional amendments in Indonesia. The study aims to assess whether presidential term limits should be constitutionally entrenched as unamendable provisions in order to safeguard Indonesia’s post-authoritarian constitutional order. Employing normative legal research, this study applies conceptual and statutory approaches by analyzing constitutional theory, comparative constitutional practices, constitutional court decisions, and Indonesian constitutional provisions, particularly the 1945 Constitution and its amendments. The findings demonstrate that presidential term limits are frequently targeted through formally valid constitutional amendments that substantively erode democratic principles, illustrating the paradox of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. Comparative experiences from Latin America, Africa, and Europe reveal that the removal or extension of term limits systematically reinforces incumbency advantages and weakens checks and balances. In the Indonesian context, debates surrounding the possibility of extending presidential terms highlight the vulnerability of constitutional safeguards when amendment procedures are dominated by political majorities. This article argues that designating presidential term limits as an eternity clause—or at minimum treating them as a substantive constitutional principle subject to strict judicial protection—is essential to preserving constitutional justice. Such entrenchment would reinforce Indonesia’s constitutional identity, prevent the abuse of amendment powers, and ensure that constitutional change remains aligned with democratic accountability and the rule of law.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Allan, T. R. S. “Constitutional Justice and the Concept of Law.” In Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory, 1–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Arslan, Zühtü. “Why Do We Need Constitutional Justice.” Constitutional Court Republic of Türkiye, n.d.

Bernhardt, M.Daniel, and Daniel E. Ingerman. “Candidate Reputations and the ‘Incumbency Effect.’” Journal of Public Economics 27, no. 1 (June 1985): 47–67. doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90028-3.

Brecht, Arnold. Federalism and Regionalism in Germany: The Division of Prussia. Oxford University Press, 1945.

Chilton, Adam, and Mila Versteeg. “Do Constitutional Unamendability Rules Make a Difference?” Public Choice, November 21, 2025. doi:10.1007/s11127-025-01350-w.

CNN Indonesia. “Jokowi Didesak 3 Periode: Saya Taat Konstitusi Dan Kehendak Rakyat.” CNN Indonesia, n.d.

Corrales, Javier, and Michael Penfold. “Manipulating Term Limits in Latin America.” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 4 (October 2014): 157–68. doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0066.

Dixon, R., and D. Landau. “Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 3 (July 1, 2015): 606–38. doi:10.1093/icon/mov039.

Landau, David. “Abusive Constitutionalism.” U.C. Davis Law Review 47, no. 189 (2013). https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/555.

———. “Constitution-Making and Authoritarianism in Venezuela: The First Time as Tragedy; the Second Time as Farce.” In Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?, edited by Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet, 161–63. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Lev, Daniel S. The Transition to Guided Democracy : Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959. Equinox Publishing, 2009.

Lieske, Joel. “The Political Dynamics of Urban Voting Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (February 1989): 150. doi:10.2307/2111257.

Lott, John, Kermit Daniel, and John R Lott. “Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from California’s State Legislative Race.” Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics, 1997. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics.

Mader, George. “Binding Authority: Unamendability in the United States Constitution-A Textual and Historical.” Marquette Law Review 99, no. 4 (2016). http://lawrepository.ualr.edu/faculty_scholarship.

Marzuki, Peter Mahmud. Penelitian Hukum. Malang: Setara Press, 2010.

Moroșteș, Anca-Florina, and Narcisa-Mihaela Stoicu. “Constitutional Justice.” Journal of Legal Studies 19, no. 33 (June 1, 2017): 135–42. doi:10.1515/jles-2017-0010.

Muth, Daniela. “Basic Conceptions of The Legal System: A Critical Comparison Between New Zealand and Germany.” Canterbury Law Review 10 (2004): 451.

Roznai, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, The Limits of Amendment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Sunstein, Cass R. “Constitutionalism, Prosperity, Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe.” Constitutional Political Economy 2, no. 3 (September 1991): 371–94. doi:10.1007/BF02393136.

Suteu, Silvia. “Friends or Foes: Is Unamendability the Answer to Democratic Backsliding?” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 16, no. 2 (August 12, 2024): 315–38. doi:10.1007/s40803-024-00233-4.

Downloads

Published

2026-02-01